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I. Anonymity and Fairness  
>  Giving in dictator game experiments has often been 
interpreted as evidence of other-regarding preferences or 
fairness.  
>  A meta-analysis of 129 dictator game studies (Engel 2011) 
reports that subjects allocate on average 28.58% of their 
endowment to anonymous co-players.  
>  However, some studies suggest that this is an artifact and 
that anonymity erodes the norm of fairness  (e.g. Franzen 
and Pointner 2012).  
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On each place in the lab a pack with 11 closed and 11 open 


















































x = 3.09, n = 81 
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The RRT Dictator Game: Results  
 
 Blue bars show the intentional choices (open envelopes), x = 0.69, n = 59; 



















offers to subjects 
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Results  
>  Other-regarding preferences almost disappear under 
conditions of anonymity.  
>  Fairness depends on being watched, on the opportunity to 
gain a favorable reputation.  
>  Two groups of studies with similar results:  
—  Variation of anonymity (e.g. in Hoffman et al. 1996, Andreoni 
and Bernheim 2009, Dana et al. 2007)  
—  “Watching-Eyes”-effect (Bateson et al. 2006, Ekström 2012, 
Haley and Fessler 2005, etc.)  
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II. Altruistic punishment and Anonymity  
 
>  Altruistic punishment, a behavior that sanctions other’s 
misconduct at own costs, is also at odds with the payoff-
maximizing principle.  
>  Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002) demonstrated in a Public 
Good Game (PGG) that players sanction uncooperative 
co-players at own costs and enable cooperation between 
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Periods 5 and 6
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III. Hypotheses  
 
 
 Why is there altruistic punishment? 
 
>  Emotional reasons (subjects feel anger or outrage) (Fehr 
and Gächter 2000, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Sanfey et 
al. 2003) 
>  Signaling motive: Subjects like to be perceived as norm 








>  We test the robustness of altruistic punishment in an 
Ultimatum Game (UG) 
>  Comparing standard UG (double-blind) with high 
anonymity condition (RRT).  
>  Hypothesis 1a: Rejection rates remain unchanged; 
emotions drive altruistic punishment. 
>  Hypothesis 1b: Rejection rates drop;           
punishment is due to signaling, observation.  
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IV. Experimental Design I 
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standard double blind  - 36 
2 random mechanism 
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Experimental design: standard UG  
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Contain notes with 
YES or NO 
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Experimental design: RRT UG  
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Low signal strength: numbers 1 and 2 (2/6)  
High signal strength: numbers 1, 2, 3, 4 (4/6) 
Contain notes 
with YES or NO 
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Differences between conditions are not statistically significant.  
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2)  Same offer is given simultaneously; if R1 accepts, he gets the money, if one responder  
rejects, P gets nothing.     
accept reject 
(0/0) 
t1 = 1-x 
accept reject 
(0/0) 
t1 = 1-x 
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 >  In contrast to fair behavior in dictator games, altruistic 
punishment is robust under high degree of anonymity.   
>  Emotions drive altruistic punishment and not the desire to 
display norm obedience.  
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